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Will the rising share of ethnic minorities in western societies spark a backlash or lead to greater
acceptance of diversity? This paper examines this question through the prism of the UK Independence
Party (UKIP), the most successful populist right party in British history. The paper contributes to work on
contextual effects by arguing that ethnic levels and changes cross-pressure white opinion and voting. It
argues that high levels of established ethnic minorities reduce opposition to immigration and support for
UKIP among White Britons. Conversely, more rapid ethnic changes increase opposition to immigration
and support for UKIP. Longitudinal data demonstrates that these effects are not produced by self-
selection. The data further illustrate that with time, diversity levels increase their threat-reducing po-
wer while the threatening effects of ethnic change fade. Results suggest that the contextual effects
literature needs to routinely unpack levels from changes. This also suggests that if the pace of immi-
gration slows, immigration attitudes should soften and populist right voting decline.
Crown Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Does diversity heighten or reduce white threat perceptions?
This paper claims that this depends on which form of diversity we
examine: levels or changes. The level of ethnic diversity, in the
British case, consists of the local proportion of non-White British
population. This is distinct from ethnic change: the rate of increase
of the local non-White British population. This paper surmises that,
for the British case, local minority levels are conducive to contact
and minority changes to threat. Others, working on different cases
(i.e. Newman, 2013), have tested one argument or the other, but not
both together - even where they have included both level and
change variables in the same model. Moreover, there is a paradox:
prior ethnic change, i.e. immigration, contributes to current mi-
nority levels. How then does threat-enhancing diversity transmute
into threat-reducing diversity? This work provides an answer:
habituation. That is, the threatening effects of ethnic change fade
over time while threat-reducing properties of minority levels in-
crease in power with time. Therefore, in addition to testing the
levels versus changes argument for Britain, this work advances and
tests the habituation mechanism. A ﬁnal aim of the paper is to setcial Research Council (ESRC),
ch. An earlier version of this
Association meetings in San
evier Ltd. This is an open access arthese ﬁndings within the context of a meta-analysis of all work
undertaken between 1995 and 2016 on the impact of ethno-
contextual effects on immigration attitudes and populist right
voting.1. Background
The contact hypothesis, originally developed by social psychol-
ogists, argues that when members of the dominant ethnic group -
i.e. native-born whites in the US or White British in the UK - have
the chance to positively interact withminorities in their locale, they
becomemore comfortable with difference (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew
and Tropp, 2006). Diverse contexts tend to lead tomore contact. For
instance, a White British person has a 0.65 probability of having no
minority friends if she lives in a homogeneous ward, but this drops
- controlling for individual and area attributes - to only 0.07 in a
ward comprised of 90 percent minorities (UKHLS, 2014). The
literature thus ﬁnds that contextual diversity ameliorates white
attitudes to immigration and outgroups, especially in small geog-
raphies below that of the ward/census tract (10,000 population).
Thus Kaufmann and Harris (2015) locate 24 studies using contex-
tual variables from low geographies and ﬁnd that three-quarters
report a positive contact effect.
Against the contact hypothesis, the threat hypothesis claims
that diversity stimulates white opposition to immigration. Work onticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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of Key (1949) and Blalock (1957) revealed higher levels of white
segregationist voting in Southern counties with higher proportions
of African-Americans, as in the Mississippi Delta or coastal South
Carolina. Later work generalized these ﬁndings to the Midwest and
Northeast (Stein et al., 2000: 286). As Robert Putnam notes, di-
versity, far from incubating toleration, often results in heightened
inter-ethnic conﬂict (Putnam, 2007).
Beyond the contextual literature, this work is concerned more
broadly with the question of political demography e whether
population change arising from differences in rates of birth, death,
migration or age structures between populations affects politics
(Goldstone et al., 2012). It therefore contributes to work on differ-
ential ethnic population growth, a subﬁeld of political demography
which examines the effect of ethnic change on collective percep-
tions and behaviour (i.e. Toft, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2011).
2. Levels or changes?
Echoing the political demography perspective, scholars have
recently questioned whether variation in levels of minority pres-
ence offers the best test of the contact and threat hypotheses
(Newman and Velez, 2014). Instead, they counter that the accent
should be placed on ethnic change, which induces a sense of
dissonance among native-born whites. In a separate project with
Matthew Goodwin, I performed an exhaustive meta-analysis of all
papers on immigration attitudes or far right voting we could ﬁnd
published between 1995 and early 2016 that included an ethno-
contextual independent variable (Kaufmann and Goodwin, 2016).
Across the contextual effects literature, we identiﬁed 69 tests of
ethnic change on immigration opinion or far right voting in 32
published studies since 1995. These appear in Appendix I.1
52 of 69 tests ﬁnd that ethnic change at some level of geography
is associated with increased opposition to immigration or higher
populist right support. When restricted to studies reporting sta-
tistically signiﬁcant contextual effects, 27 of 31 tests (87%) across 17
studies report a threat effect and just 4 a signiﬁcant contact effect
(see Appendix II). This compares to only 65% of 37 statistically
signiﬁcant tests in 26 studies based on ethnic levels which identify
a threat effect (35% ﬁnd a threat reduction effect) (see Appendix V).
Virtually none of these control for ethnic change. Thus while
contextual studies usingminority change as the contextual measure
overwhelmingly report threat effects, those based on minority
levels are more evenly split between threat and contact outcomes.
We also found, using a funnel plot, no evidence of publication bias
towards reporting positive results.
To cite just a few examples: Hopkins (2010) ﬁnds that native-
born white Americans in ethnically-changing neighbourhoods,
when sensitised by the salience of immigration in the news, are
signiﬁcantly more anti-immigration than those in more demo-
graphically stable areas.2 Harris (2012: 177, 220) uncovers strong
positive effects of minority change on the extreme right British
National Party (BNP)’s ward-level vote share using ecological anal-
ysis. Newman (2013) shows that rapid minority increase in previ-
ously non-diverse counties is associated with greater white
American hostility to immigration. Abrajano and Hajnal (2015: 132)1 Tests include either: a) separate studies using the variable; b) separate models
within studies using the variable; or c) separate terms within models using the
variable.
2 Some claim that perceptions of immigrant presence do not match reality, and
thus the ‘treatment’ of immigration is inchoate. Yet, while respondents generally
overstate the share of minorities and immigrants in their locale, those in more
diverse or immigrant-rich zip codes and counties report much higher levels and
changes than those in less diverse places (Newman and Velez, 2014: 6e7).report that a high rate of Latino growth in a county is associated
with a positive stimulus to anti-immigration views. Individuals with
authoritarian personality proﬁles are particularly sensitive to
change: their preference for order interacts with local ethnic shifts
to produce highly negative attitudes to immigration (Johnston et al.,
2015). Qualitative work, meanwhile, ﬁnds abundant evidence of
white anti-immigration mobilisation in ethnically transforming lo-
cales such as Carpentersville, Illinois, Farmer's Branch, Texas or
Barking and Dagenham, England (Vicino, 2013; Gest, 2016).
Only two published articles on populist right voting I am aware
of report signiﬁcant effects for both ethnic levels and changes.
Kessler and Freeman (2005: 276e9) show that when a term for
ethnic change is introduced alongside ethnic levels, the sign for
levels switches from positive to negative while ethnic change
strengthens its power to predict European populist right party
support. This did not form the basis of an argument about the
divergent effects of levels and changes. This is analogous to this
paper's claim. The article did not, however, elaborate upon this
ﬁnding. The other study is an article on Front National support in
France using ecological regression. It found the opposite relation-
ship to that postulated here at the Departement (population me-
dian of 500,000) level, though not at the smaller Commune level
(i.e. Della Posta, 2013).3. Hypotheses
From the literature, I hypothesise that local minority levels
reduce native-born white threat perceptions while changes elevate
it. Given the organic connection between ethnic change and ethnic
levels, I also postulate a habituation mechanism: as changes
translate into high ethnic levels, however, the effects of the past are
transformed. Thus time reduces threat as changes fade and older
levels of ethnic diversity gain legitimacy. Hence I expect that:
H1. Higher levels of ethnic minorities in a respondent's context
predict lower UKIP support and opposition to immigration
H2. Faster increase in ethnic minorities in a respondent's context
predicts higher UKIP support and opposition to immigration
H3. Fading of change over time: faster increase in ethnic minor-
ities in a respondent's context in the 2000s predicts higher UKIP
support, but this is less true for ethnic changes from the previous
decade (1990s)
H4. Enhanced minority establishment over time: higher levels of
ethnic minorities in a respondent's context over a decade ago
(1990s) are a stronger predictor of lower UKIP support and oppo-
sition to immigration than levels of ethnic minorities in the current
decade (2000s)
Finally,
H5. The association between higher minority levels and lower
threat is not produced by the self-selection of whites who dislike
diversity out of diverse areas leaving disproportionately tolerant
whites behind4. Data
I use several sources for this research. In order to measure UKIP
support and the political proﬁle of White British movers, I use
waves 1e4 of the Understanding Society (UKHLS) survey. Under-
standing Society is an annual longitudinal study of approximately
45,000 individuals, including a minority boost sample. I use 1991,
2001 and 2011 ward-level British census data which is attached to
individual survey records in the UKHLS. A common 2001 ward
E. Kaufmann / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 57e69 59geography is used to link census data across the three census dates.
3 Note that UK wards average approximately 6500 population so
offer a good example of a low-level geography in which I might
expect to ﬁnd contact effects.
While similar to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in
theUnited States, UKHLS containsmodules covering awider arrayof
subjective measures. Party vote, political participation, political at-
titudes, reasons for moving, attitudes to locale and national identity
are included in at least some survey waves. This permits the analyst
to guard against endogeneity, i.e. whetherwhiteswho support UKIP
aremore likely to leave diverse areas. TheUKHLS enables the user to
examine the beliefs ofwhiteswho leave, enter and remain in diverse
areas, enabling the generation of a four-year longitudinal panel
dataset of White British incomers to, outmigrants from, and stayers
in, diverse or homogeneous wards. The sample consists of 170,460
person-years, of which 124,524 person-years of responses are ob-
tained from approximately 46,500 White British individuals. 83
percent of the wave 2 sample responded inwave 3, though attrition
rates are higher among ethnic minorities, youth and movers.4
In addition, I examine the effect of Local Authority ethnic levels
and changes on reported UKIP vote in the 2014 European election
using the British Election Study (BES) 2015 Combined Internet
Panel Study. Data is drawn from waves 1 and 2 of the BES
(Fieldhouse et al., 2015), a sample of over 24,000 individuals across
the UK including almost 6000 UKIP voters.
To assess how ward ethnic context affects white attitudes to
immigration, I draw on the Home Ofﬁce Citizenship Surveys, which
sample approximately 15,000 respondents per year - 5000 from
non-European minority groups and 10,000 whites (Ofﬁce for
National Statistics and Home Ofﬁce, 2010, 2011). The survey was
conducted biennally or annually in England and Wales between
2001 and 2011. Ward-level geocoded data for the 2009e10 and
2010-11 surveys have been obtained through survey ﬁrms. Other
years are not available at the geographic scale required.5 The pooled
2-year sample yields approximately 16,000 White British re-
spondents, the target group. The survey is rich in questions per-
taining to attitudes toward immigration, ethnic relations and
perceptions of locality.
A ﬁnal source is 2010, 2011 and 2012 Local Government election
results from the University of Plymouth Elections Centre, which are
attached to 2011 ward-level census data. This permits the analysis
of a much larger sample of UKIP (and BNP) voters than is possible in
surveys such as UKHLS.65. Method
The analysis proceeds as follows. I begin by examining
individual-level UKIP voting from four waves of the UKHLS. This3 Potential problems associated with changes in ward boundaries between the
1991 and 2001 censuses are mitigated by use of GeoConvert software (http://
geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/, accessed July 2, 2013). To arrive at common 2001e2011
wards, wards are reconstructed from a common geography based on Middle Layer
Super Output Areas.
4 Martin Mitchell, Debbie Collins and Ashley Brown. 2015. ‘Factors affecting
participation in Understanding Society: Qualitative study with panel members,’
NatCen Social Research. https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/research/
publications/working-paper/understanding-society/2015-04.pdf.
5 I thank Ipsos-Mori for permitting access to ward-level data for the 2009e10
and 2010-11 surveys which makes multi-level analysis possible. Geocoded data for
the 2007e8 and 2008-9 surveys has been purchased from NatCen, but NatCen only
permit a very coarse banding at the contextual level, which militates against multi-
level analysis.
6 http://www1.plymouth.ac.uk/research/ceres/TEC/thecentre/Pages/default.aspxI
thank Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher at the Elections Centre, Plymouth for
access to the data.analysis includes a test of endogeneity, i.e. the ‘white ﬂight’ hy-
pothesis. This is followed by several robustness checks. The ﬁrst
focuses on immigration opinion in the Citizenship Surveys. This
followed by an analysis of UKIP voting in the British Election Study
(BES) using Local Authority (LA)-level contextual parameters
(ward-level parameters are not available for BES due to disclosure
risk). Finally I include an ecological analysis of UKIP and British
National Party (BNP) voting at ward level for the years 2010e12.
5.1. UKIP support in the UKHLS
As noted, I ﬁrst perform an analysis of support for the UK In-
dependence Party (UKIP) at individual level, using Understanding
Society (UKHLS) data.
5.1.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable for this study is comprised of the
combined response to the questions ‘If there were to be a general
election tomorrow, which political party do you think youwould be
most likely to support?’ and ‘which party do you feel closest to?’7
While party support and vote intention are discrete variables,
there is a close relationship between the two. Moreover, the two
questions are asked of different respondents in each wave, so
amalgamating them does not duplicate responses. One of the
response categories in both questions is ‘other party’, followed by a
write-in option. This is where a UKIP or other populist right
response may appear. Only 10e14 percent of those who said ‘other
party’ failed to name a recognisable party and most of these were
‘don't know’ or uncodeable responses and thus are unlikely to be
skewing the data. This generates 2091 UKIP person-years out of
approximately 130,000 White British person-years of data on the
two political questions across waves 1e4.
UKIP support amounts to just 2 percent of the sample (3.1
percent of White British who supplied a political response) in wave
4 [2012e14]. This is a considerable undercount given UKIP's actual
2014 European election popular vote of 26.6 percent and 2015
general election result of 12.6 percent. Wave 4 is largely drawn
from 2012 to 13 responses, and while UKIP support was rising in
this period from a lower base (16 percent in 2009 European elec-
tions, 3 percent in 2010 general election), the structure of the
UKHLS partisanship questions underestimates UKIP support and I
must be attentive to the possibility this selects for more committed
UKIP partisans. Particular individuals do account for multiple
person-years of data, yet the data show a notable increase in UKIP
support in wave 4 and considerable individual variability. For
instance, only around 20 percent of UKIP supporters in a givenwave
were supporters in the previous wave; for vote intenders, this rises
to 35 percent. Among vote intenders in a given wave less than 15
percent were party supporters in a previous wave, and vice-versa.
Once again, the dependent variable is a dummy for UKIP support
or vote intention in a given year.
5.1.2. Independent variables
Individual-level variables include age, sex, highest educational
qualiﬁcation (run as a continuous variable) and income, which
previous analyses suggest would predict a UKIP vote (Ford and
Goodwin, 2014). Contextual parameters are drawn from the
census (ONS, 2013). These include the proportion of the ward of
residence comprised of non-European ethnic minorities and the
rate of non-European minority increase in the ward since 2001.7 For response categories, see: https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/
documentation/mainstage/dataset-documentation/wave/1/questionnaire-module/
politics_w1.
Table 1
Model of UKIP support, 2009e14.
All minority Visible minority White 'Other'
2011 wave (ref 2010 wave) 0.347***
(0.077)
0.349***
(0.077)
0.348***
(0.077)
2012 wave (ref 2010 wave) 0.107
(0.075)
0.110
(0.075)
0.108
(0.075)
2013 wave (ref 2010 wave) 0.676***
(0.073)
0.673***
(0.073)
0.669***
(0.073)
age 0.028***
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.002)
0.028***
(0.002)
female 0.708***
(0.064)
0.708***
(0.064)
0.707***
(0.064)
education 0.004***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
income 0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
minority increase 2001e11 0.015**
(0.005)
minority % 2001 0.016***
(0.004)
visible minority increase 0.018**
(0.006)
visible minority % 2001 0.013***
(0.004)
white 'other' increase 0.032*
(0.013)
white 'other' % 2001 2.392
(1.244)
constant 4.459***
(0.150)
4.440***
(0.151)
4.448***
(0.150)
N 128,144 128,306 128,144
Individuals 46,515 46,528 46,515
Pseudo R2 0.0564 0.0562 0.0559
Source: UKHLS 2009e14. *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001.
E. Kaufmann / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 57e6960Similar shares are calculated for levels and changes in ‘White Other’
(mainly Eastern European) share and for combined non-European
and White Other ‘minority’ total.
5.2. Results
Results of a logistic regression of UKIP vote, with robust stan-
dard errors, is presented in Table 1. The ﬁrst point to notice is that
individuals in the most recent wave are associated with a signiﬁ-
cantly greater likelihood of supporting UKIP. This reﬂects the rising
trajectory of UKIP over the 2012e14 period (Ford and Goodwin,
2014).8 As expected, older, male, less educated and poorer voters
are signiﬁcantly associatedwith support for UKIP, reﬂecting the ‘left
behind’ social proﬁle advanced by Ford and Goodwin.
Focus on the effects of the contextual parameters in the lowerhalf
of the table. Notice that the level ofminorities in a respondent'sward
of residence predicts a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of supporting or
intending to vote for UKIP (H1). Yet changes in minority share are
associated with the obverse: a signiﬁcantly elevated likelihood of
backing UKIP (H2). Levels and changes have disparate effects in the
hypothesised (H1 and H2) direction. The change effect for UKIP
voting is robust to the substitution of 1991 or 2001minority share for
2011 minority share. Deprivation and population density in ward
were not signiﬁcant. Local Authority levels and changes are not sig-
niﬁcant when ward levels or changes are present in the model.
Non-European minority demographics exert stronger effects in
this model than the share of European minorities, but using
different indicators than the ‘White Other’ census category (which8 Low support in 2011 compared to 2010 may reﬂect the positive (for UKIP) effect
of the 2009 European election on the ‘who would you vote for’ question as asked in
wave 1 (2009e10), compared to 2010e11 when respondents may have interpreted
this as referring to the 2010 General Election where UKIP support was much lower.includes West Europeans) produces different results. If, in place of
‘white other increase,’we substitute a term for East European (born
in post-2004 EU accession country) increase over 2001e11, this
produces stronger ‘white other’ than ‘visible minority’ threat ef-
fects. There is also a 0.45 correlation between the ‘visible minority’
and ‘white other’ population shares at ward level, which compli-
cates interpretation, though acceptable variance inﬂation toler-
ances (VIF<4) are not breached. All told, while these results might
suggest UKIP voting is more sensitive to non-European than Eu-
ropean minority levels and changes, this conclusion should be
interpreted with caution.
The main point to take away is the pattern of disparate
contextual effects from minority levels and changes on the
dependent variable. Fig. 1 shows that a move from 0 to 50 percent
minorities in ward reduces White British respondents’ predicted
probability of supporting UKIP from 0.02 to 0.005. Ethnic change
predicts the opposite: a decline in minority share of 20 points
during the decade of the 2000s is associated with a probability of
voting UKIP of just 0.009. However, in wards with a 20-point in-
crease in minority share over this period, this rises to 0.023.>95.3. Self-selection tests
Our ﬁndings thus far show that higher shares of ethnic minor-
ities in a White British individual's ward predict lower UKIP sup-
port. Contact theory would explain this as the result of positive
contact between whites and ethnic minorities. However, threat
theorists could legitimately demur, claiming that anti-immigration
whites tend to disproportionately leave diverse areas leaving
tolerant whites behind. This, not contact, best explains white
tolerance in more diverse wards. Therefore I need to address the
endogeneity, or self-selection, problem posed by ‘white ﬂight’ and
avoidance. As Abrajano and Hajnal (2015:151) comment, ‘any
further conclusions about neighbourhood context will have to wait
until more rigorous testing can incorporate selection issues at
lower levels of aggregation.’ This paper addresses this concern.
To test for self-selection, I need to know whether UKIP-voting
whites tend to disproportionately outmigrate from, or avoid,
diverse areas. Our modelling strategy is to ﬁrst test for white ﬂight
from, then to address white avoidance of, diverse areas by white
domestic migrants. The UKHLS, as a longitudinal, large-sample
survey containing questions on voting, permits us to do this in a
way that is not yet possible with American data. The PSID contains
no political questions and the GSS panel survey arguably lacks
adequate sample size e for instance, there were just 40 white in-
dividuals who moved tract within their county in the 2008e10 GSS
panel (Schachter, 2015). I attach census data for 1991, 2001 and
2011 assigned to a common ward geography.
Our ﬁrst model asks whether UKIP-voting White British re-
spondents are more likely to leave awardwith a large share of non-
European minorities than non-UKIP voting White British re-
spondents. The dependent variable in model 1 is a dummy coded 1
for a move out and 0 for remaining in, or moving within, a ward.10 If
threat theorists are correct, I would expect UKIP voters to be
disproportionately represented among those leaving diverse areas,
provided I control for confounding predictors of mobility such as
age, income, marital status and education. I restrict the analysis to
White British respondents.
The dependent variable in model 2, which is restricted toWhite9 Note that, due to distinct sampling frames, the range of minority change (20
to þ20) is somewhat different in the UKHLS data as compared to the Citizenship
Surveys, where ward level ethnic change was in the 4 to þ36 range.
10 A move to a ward of similar ethnic diversity is coded 0.
Fig. 1.
Source: UKHLS 2009e2014.
11 Note that the typical drop in minority share with such a move is actually much
larger. That is, if one does not control for independent variables such as deprivation
or population density, the decline in minority share rises because diverse wards are
also urban and poor while the suburban, wealthier destination wards which attract
more movers tend to be considerably whiter (Catney and Simpson, 2010).
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and destination ward. This measures how the share of minorities
changes with a white individual's move. An individual who moves
from a ward with a large share of minorities to a homogeneously
white ward scores a strong negative (in theory up to 100% mi-
norities) whereas a respondent whomoves from a homogeneous to
a diverse areawould show an increase inward minority share of up
to þ100%. The dependent variable could in theory span 100
to þ100 though the actual range in the data is 79 to þ86. If threat
theorists are correct, I would expect UKIP voters to be over-
represented among those in the high minus category (leaving
minority-rich wards) while being underrepresented in the ﬂow
towards them.
Model 1 considers white ﬂight. Here the key parameter is the
interaction between UKIP support and share of minorities in origin
ward. The data show a small effect for minority share, suggesting
that White British respondents are more likely to move from
(rather than remain in) diverse wards as compared to white ones,
but within the white ﬂow, UKIP voters do not stand out. That is,
whites who back UKIP and live in diversewards are not signiﬁcantly
more likely to leave their ward than non-UKIP voting whites in
similarly diverse wards, or UKIP-voting whites who live in lily-
white wards. This casts doubt on threat theorists’ contention that
self-selection of UKIP supporters out of diverse wards accounts for
the relative tolerance, i.e. low UKIP voting, of whites in high-
minority contexts.
Model 2 examines white avoidance. The higher the share of
minorities in a respondent's ward of origin, the bigger the drop in
the share of minorities experienced as a result of a move. This is
mainly an artefact of the supply of alternative wards: any person,
white or otherwise, who lives in a high minority ward has very few
higher-minority wards to choose from. This said, the data (not
shown) reveal that whites leaving high-minority wards choose
signiﬁcantly whiter areas to move to than minorities originating
from similar areas even when population density and deprivationare accounted for. But the main effect and interactions for UKIP
support are not signiﬁcant. In other words, while whites move to
whiter wards than minorities e all else being equal, UKIP and non-
UKIP supporting whites move to equally white wards. This supports
H5.
We see this in Fig. 2, based on Table 2, where the conﬁdence
intervals for the red line for UKIP-voting whites and blue line for
non-UKIP voting whites overlap. That is, among whites, with a
range of individual and contextual predictors held at their mean
values, both UKIP and non-UKIP voting respondents originating in
wards with 46 percent minorities at time t-1 tend to move to wards
which contain 13 points fewer minorities (i.e. are 33 percent mi-
nority) at time t.11 Once again, I ﬁnd no support for the view that
the self-selection of UKIP supporters out of diverse wards explains
the ﬁnding in Table 1 that higher local minority share is associated
with signiﬁcantly lower UKIP voting. This conﬁrms H5 and suggests
that contact rather than threat best explains our ﬁndings with re-
gard to minority levels.
Immigration attitudes, much more than social background,
predicts UKIP support (Evans and Mellon, 2016). I therefore replace
UKIP support with attitudes to immigration as the dependent
variable to probe for a similar disjuncture between the effect of
ethnic levels and changes on white threat perceptions.5.4. Immigration opinion
5.4.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable for this study is the Citizenship Survey
Fig. 2.
Source: UKHLS 2009e2014.
Table 2
Models predicting mobility (white British respondents only), 2009-14.
Model 1 Model 2
Logistic regression predicting move
out of ward, robust std. errors
GLS linear regression predicting
increase in minority share in
ward due to move
Mover (lag) 0.791 (0.063)***
Minority population share in ward (lag) 0.003 (0.001)* -0.372 (0.012)***
UKIP supporter (lag) -0.074 (0.196) -0.877 (4.109)
UKIP supporter x Minority
population share (lag)
0.004 (0.008) 0.363 (0.421)
Pseudo R2/R2 0.130 0.472
N 77,950 3868
Groups 34,327 3365
Source: UKHLS 2009e2014. *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001. The following (lagged) controls were added to model 1 but are not shown: wards -
population density, share unemployed; individuals - age, highest educational qualiﬁcation, marital status, income and housing tenure. For model
2, wards - change in share unemployed, change in population density; individual controls same as model 1.
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Britain nowadays should be changed?' Answers follow a 5-category
ordinal scale: 'increased a lot', 'increased a little', 'stay the same',
'decreased a little,' 'decreased a lot.' This variable is far from nor-
mally distributed, with a heavy slant toward reduction. Thus it has
been recoded as two distinct dependent variables. The ﬁrst is a
binary reduce/do not reduce dummy variable which groups the
roughly 81 percent of UK-born whites who desire a reduction into
one category (1), and those favouring the same or more immigra-
tion (0) into a second. A second formulation isolates a dummy
variable in which the approximately 60 percent of whites who
desire that immigration be reduced 'a lot' are coded 1 and others 0.
The analysis is restricted to white, UK-born residents.1212 There is no ethnicity question in the Citizenship Survey which permits the
isolation of UK-born white respondents who are not of English or Welsh ethnic
identity (i.e. Jewish, Irish, Polish). However, UK-born White Other is a minimal
category outside London and many whites of Irish background now identify on the
census as White British. Again, as the 2011 census revealed, London is an exception,
so a dummy variable for London captures much of this effect.5.4.2. Independent variables
I test a variety of individual-level parameters. Demographic and
economic variables include age, marital status, sex, income, edu-
cation, accommodation type (renter, owner, council tenant).
Contextual parameters are drawn from the 2011 census except
where noted. These include the proportion of the ward of residence
comprised of ethnic minorities and the rate of minority increase in
the ward since 2001. I consider the share of unemployed and
population density in a ward, as well as minority share at Local
Authority (LA) level.5.5. Results
Table 3 presents a logistic regression of White UK-born immi-
gration opinion (reduce vs. same/increase) on individual and
contextual variables. Only intercepts (not slopes) for contextual
variables are considered. As expected from the literature, I ﬁnd that
older respondents and those without formal educational qualiﬁ-
cations are more opposed to immigration. Women do not differ
from men in their attitudes. Critically for this paper, I ﬁnd that the
Table 3
Predictors of Attitudes to immigration among White UK-born British, 2009-11.
Reduce Reduce a lot
Age 0.112***
(0.015)
0.172***
(0.013)
Female 0.019
(0.042)
0.009
(0.033)
No qualiﬁcations 0.491***
(0.066)
0.585***
(0.051)
Ward minority % 0.025***
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.003)
Ward deprivation 0.062***
(0.016)
0.111***
(0.015)
Ward urban/rural 0.064
(0.055)
0.077
(0.053)
Ward minority change % 0.026***
(0.007)
0.027**
(0.009)
constant 0.884***
(0.123)
0.296*
(0.114)
N 15,097 15,097
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.032
Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009e11 (Ofﬁce for National Statistics and Home Ofﬁce,
2010, 2011). *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001.
13 This understates the level ofWhite British UKIP support because minorities have
a lower rate of UKIP voting.
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reduced opposition while the change in minority population be-
tween 2001 and 2011 is linked with greater opposition to immi-
gration. Those in more deprived wards evince greater opposition.
The pattern of contextual effects aligns with the models in Table 1
based on UKIP support in the UKHLS. 81 percent of White UK-born
respondents favour reduction and 60 percent favour the ‘reduce a
lot’ option. Yet a similar model emerges when I alter the dependent
variable from reduce vs. same/increase to reduce a lot vs. reduce a
little/same/increase.
The black set of lines in Fig. 3 shows that the predicted proba-
bility of a White UK-born respondent favouring reduced immigra-
tion, with all other variables held at their means, falls from 0.85 in a
ward with no minorities (denoted ‘ML0’) to 0.62 in a ward
comprised of 50 percent minorities, denoted ‘ML50’. Here it is
worth noting that 80 percent of the 8850 wards in England and
Wales are highly non-diverse: averaging just 6 percent minorities
in 2011 while 41 percent of ethnic minorities live in little more than
400 wards, which average just 40 percent white (Kaufmann and
Harris, 2014: 52). Widening conﬁdence intervals suggest less
robust inferences as the share of minorities rises toward 50 percent,
but the pattern is clear and remains statistically signiﬁcant, rein-
forcing the claims of contact theory.
Against this, the red line for minority change inward shows that
as we transition from the sample limit of 4, denoted ‘MC-4’ (i.e. 4
points fewer minorities in the respondent's ward in 2011 than in
2001) to the sample maximum of þ36 (a 36-point increase in mi-
nority share in a respondent's ward between 2001 and 2011),
denoted ‘MC36’, this corresponds to a rise in the predicted proba-
bility of favouring reduced immigration from 0.77 to 0.90. The ef-
fect is less than for levels, and is also subject to wider error over
much of its span, but is nevertheless statistically signiﬁcant.
Repeating the analysis with ‘reduce a lot’ as the dependent
variable (see Fig. 2) reveals a more pronounced pattern. For
instance, the predicted probability of a White British respondent
favouring reducing immigration by ‘a lot’ declines from 0.67 to 0.36
as one moves from zero to 50 percent minorities in the re-
spondent's ward. On the other hand, the predicted probability of
opposition rises from 0.53 to 0.76 comparing respondents in wards
with the lowest and highest ethnic minority increase over 2001e11.
This supports H1 and H2.
Throughout we see the divergent contextual effects of local
ethnic levels - which predict a contact effect of reduced oppositionto immigration; and local ethnic changes, which predict a threat
response of heightened opposition. This said, the contact effects
have a stronger effect size, which may be gleaned from the slope of
the black compared to red lines in Figs. 3 and 4. Contact effects are
also more robust, as indicated by the wider conﬁdence intervals for
the red lines.
5.6. The Local Authority context for UKIP voting in the 2014
European elections
Thus far, our analysis of anti-immigration sentiment and voting
has concentrated on the ward, a unit averaging around 6500 in-
dividuals, as ameasure of local context. I noted that higherminority
levels are associated with lower, and faster minority changes with
higher, anti-immigration sentiment and voting. What happens
when we move up to the level of the Local Authority where pop-
ulation averages just over 200,000?
The British Election Study (BES) 2015 Combined Internet Panel
Study permits us to examine the effect of Local Authority (LA)
ethnic levels and changes on reported UKIP vote. The dependent
variable is a dummy for reported UKIP vote in the May 2014 Eu-
ropean elections (1 ¼ UKIP vote, 0 ¼ No UKIP vote, including non-
voters). I also probe immigration opinion based on a 7-point scale
for the question ‘Immigration undermines or enriches cultural life’
from 1-undermines to 7-enriches. In order to minimise reverse
causation, dependent variables are based on responses in wave 2
while independent variables are drawn fromwhat the respondents
reported in wave 1. Only White British respondents are included,
which reduces sample size somewhat to 21,660. There are 5348
UKIP voters in the White British sample, representing 24.7 percent
of White British voters, and thus somewhat of an undercount
compared to the 26.6 percent obtained by UKIP in the election.13
The analysis comprises three models, shown in Table 4. The ﬁrst
is an Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) linear regression of anti-
immigration opinion based on the ‘undermines cultural life’ ques-
tion. This has also been run as an ordered logit and the coefﬁcients
are similar. Older, poorer, less educated and female respondents are
more anti-immigration. The gender ﬁnding seems counterintuitive
since the Citizenship Survey models in Table 3 show that gender is
not signiﬁcantly associated with immigration attitudes (Kaufmann
and Harris, 2015). More germane to this study, however, is that the
familiar effects of levels and changes assert themselves at the LA
level. A 1 point increase in LA district minority share in 2001 is
associated with a 0.12 of a point decrease in anti-immigration
sentiment on a 7-point Likert scale. Conversely, a 1 point rise in
the rate of minority increase in a respondent's district corresponds
to a 0.15 point increase on the anti-immigration scale.
Moving to measures of the UKIP vote in the European elections,
we ﬁnd that younger voters and women are signiﬁcantly less likely
to have voted UKIP than men, reﬂecting established scholarship
(Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Poorer and less educated voters are, by
contrast, more likely to report voting UKIP. The share of minorities
in 2001 in a respondent's LA is at borderline statistical signiﬁcance,
and signed in a negative direction, as in the anti-immigration
model. Similarly, the coefﬁcient for minority change shows a sig-
niﬁcant positive value. The ﬁnal model includes the anti-
immigration variable among the explananda on the right-hand
side of the equation. This reduces the statistical power of minor-
ity levels and changes to some extent, though minority change
remains important. This suggests that part, but not all, of the effect
of ethnic context at the LA level on UKIP voting operates via
Fig. 3.
Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009e11 (Ofﬁce for National Statistics and Home Ofﬁce, 2010, 2011).
Fig. 4.
Source: Citizenship Surveys 2009e11 (Ofﬁce for National Statistics and Home Ofﬁce, 2010, 2011).
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Now consider Fig. 5. In terms of marginal effects, based on the
‘UKIP1’ model in Table 4, a move from no ethnic change in a re-
spondent's Local Authority to a 28-point increase, the limits of this
sample, corresponds to an increase in the predicted probability of
reporting a UKIP vote from 0.20 to 0.32 with other variables held at
their means. Minority levels in a respondent's LA just fail to reachsigniﬁcance at the 0.05 level in the ‘UKIP1’ model. The predicted
probability of a UKIP vote varies by four points such that the mar-
ginal probability of a UKIP vote is 0.23 in the least (1%) and 0.19 in
the most (46%) minority-rich Local Authority when other variables
are at their mean values.
A shortcoming of the above analysis is that I cannot be sure of
the extent to which ethno-contextual dynamics at lower
Table 4
Models of immigration Attitudes and UKIP European election vote (BES).
Anti-immigration UKIP 1 UKIP 2
Age 0.006***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.001)
Female 0.088**
(0.031)
-0.451***
(0.038)
-0.527***
(0.040)
Education -0.392***
(0.012)
-0.179***
(0.014)
-0.048**
(0.015)
Deprivation (LA) 0.005
(0.006)
-0.013
(0.008)
-0.019*
(0.008)
Population density (LA) -0.004
(0.042)
0.014
(0.049)
0.014
(0.052)
2001% minorities (LA) -0.012***
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
’01e11 minority change (LA) 0.015**
(0.005)
0.025***
(0.006)
0.022**
(0.006)
Anti-immigration 0.413***
(0.011)
Income band (ref ¼ high)
low 0.161**
(0.049)
0.131*
(0.060)*
0.086
(0.063)
medium 0.148**
(0.046)
0.014
(0.057)
-0.035
(0.060)
refused to answer 0.388***
(0.054)
0.150*
(0.064)
0.012
(0.068)
constant 2.994***
(0.101)
1.505***
(0.121)
-0.436
(0.130)
R2 0.088 0.055 0.147
N 18,609 17,541 17,541
Source: BES 2015 waves 1 and 2. Data weights ‘W1W2’ have been applied.
*p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001.
E. Kaufmann / Electoral Studies 48 (2017) 57e69 65geographies such as wards, which comprise Local Authorities, are
driving the results or whether higher-level contextual effects are
key. In Table 1, using Understanding Society data, LAminority levels
and changes were signiﬁcant and showed effects broadly similar in
size to Table 4. However these washed out when ward levels and
changes were added to the model. Previous work would also sug-
gest that both levels and changes at higher geographies (i.e. LA)may
be associated with white opposition to immigration - as noted by
Abrajano and Hajnal for the US case (2015: 132). Until the BES can
negotiate access to ward census data for BES respondents, it is not
be possible to ascertainwhether higher or lower-level dynamics are
central.14 Naturally such analyses are complicated by multicollinearity: the correlation
between 2001 and 2011 change and 2011 levels is 0.64. Nonetheless, the analyses in
Table 5 show acceptable variance inﬂation statistics (VIF<4) when run as OLS
regressions.5.7. Toward ethnic accommodation?
Today's ethnic changes feed into tomorrow's ethnic levels. This
presents a paradox e how do threat effects associated with change
transform into contact effects associated with levels? No paper I am
aware of addresses this question. The answer appears to be that
yesterday's demographic changes fade through habituation, legiti-
mation and contact while yesterday's ethnic levels become
increasingly potent predictors of lower threat levels over time.
As Table 5 shows, minority levels gain in predictive power as one
goes back in time, conﬁrming H4. That is, the coefﬁcient for 1991
minority level exceeds that for 2001 or 2011 minority level in both
the UKHLS and BES. Moreover, in the BES, minority share only at-
tains signiﬁcance in 1991. One could argue that this is because
minorities in wards with a long experience of minority settlement
are viewed as ‘established’ which legitimates their presence and
hence reduces white residents' sense of dispossession and, by
extension, lowers support for UKIP. Contact may not therefore be
the onlymechanism atwork translatingminority-rich contexts into
more liberal attitudes to immigration. The ﬁgure likewise reveals
that only 2001e2011 ethnic change signiﬁcantly predicts UKIPsupport. 1991e2001 change in the same wards, though displaying
similar or larger coefﬁcients, is not signiﬁcant.14 H3 is thereby also
conﬁrmed.
Taken at once, these results indicate a pattern of shock, followed
by habituation. The freshest ethnic changes have the most dramatic
threat effects onwhite opinion. Conversely, the older the ‘tradition’
of high levels of diversity, the stronger the impact of contact effects.
This suggests two things: ﬁrst, that part of diversity's mollifying
effect may operate through legitimation over decades rather than
mere contact with immigrant groups (though it may be that inter-
ethnic contact intensiﬁes over time); and second, that periods of
rapid ethnic change correlate with heightened concern over
immigration and far right voting because threat effects are at their
maximum while contact effects have yet to build momentum.5.8. Local election results
As a ﬁnal robustness check I examine local level election data.
Actual election results contain a far larger sample of UKIP voters
(hundreds of thousands) than surveys, and are uncontaminated by
social desirability and other response bias. I examine a set of local
election results compiled during 2010e12 by the Elections Centre
at the University of Plymouth, around the time of the 2011 British
census. Local elections only take place across a subset of districts in
Britain each year thus a full set of results can only be accumulated
over several years. 2010, 2011 and 2012 election results by ward are
linked to a dataset containing 2011 ward-level census data. UKIP's
performance is also assessed against that of a more radical anti-
immigration party, the British National Party (BNP). The BNP
enjoyed greater popularity than UKIP in local elections until after
2009, when it fell prey to leadership splits and scandals (Harris,
2012).
I only examine wards in which the UKIP and BNP stood candi-
dates. Table 6 shows that UKIP ran in 945 wards over this period
and the BNP in 704. Results in the ﬁrst model in Table 4 show that
the BNP vote conforms to the previously-noted pattern whereby
high minority levels in a ward predict lower anti-immigration
sentiment and voting while faster minority change is associated
with elevated anti-immigration sentiment and voting. Indeed, this
has been the consistent ﬁnding of previous work on the BNP
(Bowyer, 2008; Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Ford and Goodwin, 2010;
Harris, 2012). Replicating the analysis with UKIP rather than BNP
vote as the dependent variable, I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst, but not the
second, relationship holds. Results are similar when I divide the
dependent variable by the White British share of the population to
exclude minority voters. Of course, aggregate results are suscepti-
ble to the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). Yet with a properly
speciﬁedmodel, these concerns can beminimised even as model ﬁt
statistics may be inﬂated because both voting and ethnicity are
geographically concentrated (Knoke, 1974).
Results are graphically reﬂected in Figs. 6 and 7. The x-axis
combines minority share and minority change (a combination of
low share and fast change is predicted to maximise threat effects),
which is plotted against BNP or UKIP vote on the vertical axis.
Notice that the slope for BNP vote share is considerably steeper
than for UKIP vote share, reﬂecting the fact that ethnic change is
only signiﬁcantly associated with elevated populist right voting in
the BNP case. This may be because UKIP declined to compete with
the BNP in strongly anti-immigrationwards in the 2010e12 period:
Fig. 5.
Source: BES 2015 (Fieldhouse et al., 2015) waves 1 and 2.
Table 5
The Effect of Past Minority Levels and Changes on current UKIP voting.
UKHLS BES
Levels (controlling for 2001e11 changes):
2011 -0.022***
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.003)
2001 -0.022***
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.003)
1991 -0.034***
(0.008)
-0.009*
(0.004)
Changes (controlling for 2001 levels):
2001e2011 0.021**
(0.008)
0.025***
(0.006)
1991e2001 0.038
(0.022)
0.025
(0.013)
Source: UKHLS 2009e14; BES 2015 (Fieldhouse et al., 2015).
*p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001. See Tables 1 and 4 (both based on 2001 levels and
2001-11 changes) for full model speciﬁcations.
Table 6
Aggregate models of UKIP and BNP local election voting, 2010-12.
BNP vote UKIP vote
% Minority 2001 0.124*
(0.049)
0.059*
(0.023)
Minority change 2001e11 0.188**
(0.066)
0.049
(0.035)
Total population 0.000*
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
% Working class 0.214***
(0.031)
0.218***
(0.035)
% Elderly 0.228***
(0.054)
0.120*
(0.058)
Constant 8.498***
(1.758)
5.143**
(1.845)
N 704 945
R2 0.304 0.230
Source: UK Local Election results (Plymouth Elections Centre) 2010e12 and 2011
Census data. *p < .05,**p < .01,***p < .001.
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further research.
A clutch of wards in Barking and Dagenham, a Local Authority
whose White British population declined from 81 to 49 percent
during 2001e11, show very high BNP support. Results are robust to
excluding Barking from the analysis, but it is worth noting this as a
paradigm case of the effects of rapid ethnic change. The BNP
shocked observers by winning 12 of 51 council seats in 2006,
leading to a high-proﬁle 2010 campaign, led by Margaret Hodge of
Labour, which mobilised newcomers and former nonvoters to turn
out and vote Labour, resulting in the BNP losing all its councillors.
This despite the BNP doubling its vote share between 2006 and
2010.15 In ﬁeldwork conducted in 2012 in Barking and Dagenham,
many white respondents cited ethnic change as a motor of BNP
support. ‘I voted BNP,’ reported a respondent named Eleanor, ‘I can't
help it. They call them Nazis. But they're not. They're Britain for
Britain. Labour sent [immigrants] all down here and [Margaret
Hodge] won't tell me where they come from. I think they ﬁddled15 ‘BNP loses all 12 seats in Barking and Dagenham council,’ BBC Election 2010, 8
May 2010.the votes, so that the BNP did not get one candidate in.’16
While UKIP also did well in several Barking wards, and by 2014
had equalled the BNP's 2006 vote share in the district, its perfor-
mance lagged behind the BNP during 2010e12. This does not
appear to be due to competition in the 256 wards in the sample in
which the two parties competed because results are similar when
these are excluded. Therefore an interpretation of the difference
between the BNP and UKIP in this period is that the pattern is
affected by each party's social proﬁle. In the UKHLS, the median
White British respondent is 49 and lives in a ward that is 11.7
percent minority. By contrast, the typical BNP supporter is 43 and
resides in a ward with 12.5 percent minorities while the median
UKIP supporter is 57 and inhabits a ward with just 10.1 percent
minorities. BNP voters are younger and live in signiﬁcantly more
diverse places than the average White Briton. UKIP voters are older
and reside in more homogeneous wards than average. Since ethnic
change in award is highly correlatedwith its existing level of ethnic
diversity, BNP voters were more likely to reside in wards experi-
encing ethnic change than UKIP voters at this time.16 Gest, 2016, ch. 3.
Fig. 6.
Source: UK Local Election results (Plymouth Elections Centre) 2010e12 and 2011 Census data. Wards coded by name of the Local Authority in which they are nested.
Fig. 7.
Source: UK Local Election results (Plymouth Elections Centre) 2010e12 and 2011 Census data. Wards coded by name of the Local Authority in which they are nested.
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What does the foregoing mean for the wider question of how
nations will respond to rising immigrant diversity? In entire na-
tions, does ethnic change elevate threat while higher established
levels of minorities calm it? In the studies I have examined which
use country as the geographic unit, 22 of 27 tests in 14 studies (13 of
14 in 6 studies reporting signiﬁcant effects) ﬁnd a threat effect from
country-level increases in immigrants or minorities (see Appendix
III and IV for details). By contrast, when restricted to 26 studies
reporting signiﬁcant results, country minority levels are associated
with threat effects in 24, and contact effects in 13, tests (see
Appendix V). Though higher minority levels predict threat in 65
percent (24 of 37) of signiﬁcant tests at country level, this is well
below the 92 percent (12 of 13) of tests reporting a threat-enhancing effect for minority change. These patterns are indica-
tive. Given the results obtained in this paper, I would expect that if
theseworks had incorporated a test for both levels and changes, the
balance of tests would move toward an association between higher
diversity levels and threat reduction.
Consider the British case, where a signiﬁcant increase in
immigration over the period 1997e2001, from roughly 50,000 to
250,000 per annum, took place. Fig. 8, drawn from Duffy and Frere-
Smith (2014) compares actual net migration with the salience of
immigration and race issues in the Ipsos-Mori issues index since
1992. The polynomial curves of the two lines exhibit a 0.78
correlation.
Since 2002, in the presence of higher annual inﬂows, the British
public has ranked immigration as its ﬁrst or secondmost important
issue. A similar relationship may be observed when plotting net
Fig. 8.
Source: Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014: 8. Issues Index question: ‘What do you see as the most/other important issues facing Britain today?’. Issues Index base: representative sample of
c.1000 British adults age 18 þ each month, interviewed face-to-face in home. Home Ofﬁce statistics based on ‘Year ending’.
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terly MP's Survey which asks Members of Parliament to list their
constituents' leading concerns. Here again, the proportion
mentioning asylum/immigration/refugees as their most important
issue broadly tracks net migration ﬁgures from the late 1980s to
January 2013. Likewise, since the high-immigration period begin-
ning in the early 2000s, the proportion of MPs mentioning
immigration-related issues as the primary concern expressed in
their constituency mailbag has averaged around 60 percent (Duffy
and Frere-Smith, 2014: 8e9). The relationship between arrivals and
public opinion is somewhat of a lacuna in current research, which
has typically focused on the downstream effect of coverage on
opinion (i.e. Dunaway et al., 2010; Hopkins, 2011; Abrajano and
Hajnal, 2015; ch. 5).
Fig. 8 shows a marked correlation between national-level in-
ﬂows and public concern over immigration. Nevertheless, this is
not an unmediated response: Duffy et al. report that net migration
correlates with negative news coverage in Lexis-Nexis.17 Thus, the
correlation could be viewed as multi-step, with rising immigration
propelling increased media coverage and politicisation, interacting
with lived experience of ethnic change to produce greater opposi-
tion to immigration. Future cross-national research is needed to
test linkages between actual immigration numbers, media
coverage and public opinion. My earlier results regarding local
change may hold lessons with respect to national patterns. Namely,
that if the pace of change slows and people habituate to higher
levels, concern may fade, as in the post-Powell era. Note that this
period habituation is a somewhat different argument from that
which posits cohort attitude change producing a steady liberali-
sation in attitudes - though this too may involve younger cohorts
becoming habituated to a 'new normal' of higher diversity (Ford,
2008; Putnam, 2007).17 Duffy, Bobby. 2015. ‘Public Attitudes: perceptions, myths and realities,’ at Na-
tional Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) conference “Immigration
and the UK-EU Relationship”, London, December 8.6. Discussion
The rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been the most
disruptive development in British party politics for a generation,
arguably helping mobilise the Brexit vote. This research claims that
ethnic change stimulates higher UKIP support while higher levels of
established minorities predict lower UKIP support. A similar
pattern characterises immigration attitudes in Britain. These ﬁnd-
ings echo those from the wider ethno-contextual effects literature.
Yet whereas some previous work (i.e. Newman, 2013) notes the
greater importance of changes compared to levels in predicting
threat effects, none I am aware of posit cross-cutting effects for
levels and changes. Nor do they show as explicitly that such ﬁnd-
ings are not an artefact of self-selection: white UKIP voters in
minority-dense wards are no more likely to leave them, or to move
to whiter wards, than their white liberal neighbours.
This research also breaks new ground by suggesting that the
threat effects of demographic change fade over time, possibly
because local white residents become accustomed to immigrant
minorities, are more likely to have positive contact with them, or
come to perceive immigrant groups as having a legitimate place in
society. This is important because while levels and changes exert
disparate effects on white opinion, yesterday's immigration ﬂows
constitute today's immigrant stock. These results suggest that if the
rate of ethnic change declines in the West in the future, opposition
to immigration and support for the populist right could similarly
abate.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.05.002.
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